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EXCLUSIONARY ZONING AND GROWTH
CONTROLS: A COMMENT ON THE APA'S
ENDORSEMENT OF THE MOUNT LAUREL
DOCTRINE
WILLIAM A. FISCHEL *
In the interest of disclosing potential biases, let me begin this com-
ment on the APA's amicus brief for the New Hampshire Supreme
Court by noting that I am an alternate member of a zoning board in a
New Hampshire town that might be regarded as practicing exclusion-
ary zoning. This is not to say that my town's practices are illegal or
differ much from those of many other New England towns. Indeed, I
have argued that fiscal zoning, which the APA equates with exclusion-
ary zoning, is the norm for most developing suburbs and growing small
towns in the United States.'
Another point on which I agree with the APA brief is that zoning
ought to work for the general welfare of all citizens of the state-in-
deed, of the whole country-not just for those inside the boundaries of
the local government doing the zoning. My disagreement with the
brief is about how to get local governments to promote the truly gen-
eral welfare. The APA argues that other state courts ought to imitate
New Jersey's Mount Laurel decisions in order to promote the construc-
tion of housing earmarked for low-income people in the suburbs. The
APA expresses little concern about the supply of housing other than
that for low-income people. My argument is that zoning's chief fault is
* Professor of Economics, Dartmouth College.
1. W. FISCHEL, THE ECONOmiCS OF ZONING LAWS 59-79, 293-338 (1985).
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to exclude too much of all development, with the result that housing
prices in growing areas are too high and that metropolitan areas be-
come too spread out.
The basis for my argument is literature overlooked by the APA
brief. These are articles and books published by economists and by
lawyers and planners who have adopted economic analysis.' This liter-
ature has dominated the intellectual terrain since the late 1970s, which
may be why almost none of the APA's references to social science stud-
ies of zoning are from the 1980s.
The more recent studies indicate that suburban zoning and land use
controls raise the cost of housing for everyone, not just the poor. Susan
Wachter and Man Cho's article on this issue is an example of this type
of study. They find that their land use restrictions index is associated
with higher housing prices in the area that adopts the restrictions, even
after other factors that affect housing costs, such as mortgage rates,
construction costs, and location within the metropolitan area, are
taken into account. The price-inflating effects of zoning also extend
over the border of the restrictive districts, which is itself an important
finding. The following analysis illustrates why.
If a community or district within a community received a large sum
of money from a benefactor who was devoted to improving the parks,
streets, schools, and other public facilities of a community, what
should we expect to happen to housing prices in that community?
Nearly all economists would answer that the price of housing would
rise. When homes went on the market in that community, prospective
buyers would see that the houses came attached to amenities superior
to those in competing areas. Because it is difficult to obtain those
amenities except by living in that community, buyers will be willing to
pay more for houses in the favored community.
People who want to defend zoning and growth management regula-
tions should point out possible analogies between adopting such regula-
tions and a benevolent donor improving community facilities. Rather
than being exclusionary, perhaps the ordinance accommodates devel-
opment at a reasonable pace and, by better planning, improves the de-
livery of public services. In this pleasant scenario, the adoption of
growth management or a new zoning law does not restrict the overall
2. For references and analysis of this literature, see W. FISCHEL, supra note 1, at
231-48; Fisehel, Do Growth Controls Really Matter? A Review of Empirical Evidence on
the Effectiveness and Efficiency of Local Government Land Use Regulations (1990) (Lin-
coln Institute of Land Policy)[hereinafter Do Growth Controls Matter?].
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supply of housing. Instead, just as in the public benefactor scenario,
the supply schedule remains the same but demand shifts outward, re-
flecting the greater attractiveness of the community.
Zoning restrictions and growth management might, on the other
hand, raise existing housing prices for a different reason. The fanciful
comparison for this case is the malevolent genie who destroys three-
quarters of the land available for building. After the evil genie's work,
parcels on which it was once possible to build forty homes on quarter-
acre lots are so disabled that only ten homes on one-acre lots can be
constructed.
No cloud lacks its silver lining, though. Owners of homes that were
already built in the community are spared by the genie (she thinks they
are related to her forebears, so she "grandfathers" their property).
These owners may be twice blessed. First, the owners escape the land
use disabilities. Second, they may find that the market values of their
homes are considerably higher. This is because the genie has shut out
the construction of many homes that might have competed in the mar-
ket for those previously built. The effect on housing prices is analogous
to the effect on automobile prices when some potentially imported cars
are excluded from the American market. American-made cars would
go up in price, along with the resale price of existing cars and the prices
of imported cars that got through the quotas.
The problem for economists is to determine which effect is pushing
up housing prices. If it is the benevolent amenity effects, there is
hardly cause for complaint. If it is supply restrictions, then public poli-
cies should be brought to bear to combat them. One way of separating
the two effects is to determine whether the regulations of one commu-
nity cause housing prices to rise in other communities in the same met-
ropolitan area. If growth controls only make the community that
adopts them more attractive, it is unlikely that there would be much
effect on neighboring communities. Thus, if growth management has
only benign amenity effects, we should be able to detect little or no
metropolitan-wide price effects, unless most communities in the metro-
politan area adopt them simultaneously.
The results of Wachter and Cho indicate that there are some spill-
over price effects from one district to the other. These spillover effects
are not as large as the within-district effects, but they suggest that even
if amenity effects exist within the community, there are some supply
restriction effects as well. This analysis confirms the results of several
other metropolitan-area and regional studies of growth controls as
1991]
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well, which I reviewed in Do Growth Controls Matter?3
The finding that suburban zoning affects the entire housing market
suggests a policy different from that of Mount Laurel. The preferred
strategy for combatting unreasonable supply restrictions would be to
give legal redress to landowner/developers. While only sparingly
granted by courts, injunctive relief is the traditional remedy available
to builders. The action complained of by the builder is struck down,
but the community is usually free to proceed with alternative regula-
tions that may frustrate the developer just as badly. For this and other
reasons, the remedy of monetary damages, either under a taking theory
or a civil rights action, is economically superior. Because both the eco-
nomic and legal analysis that leads to this remedy is readily accessible
in Robert Ellickson's important article,4 I shall not belabor it here.
It is worth noting, however, that while the APA brief studiously ig-
nores the damages remedy, it inadvertently cites the remedy's most elo-
quent judicial supporter. In pointing out a community's incentive to
delay compliance with a court order about zoning, the brief quotes a
California attorney who advised other city attorneys faced with defeat
in court: "IFALL ELSE FAILS, MEREL YAMEND THE REGULA-
TION AND START OVER AGAIN. "5
That quote is lifted, as noted in the APA brief, from Justice Bren-
nan's dissent in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego.6
What the APA brief does not point out is that Justice Brennan was
arguing in favor of a damages remedy for a regulatory taking of prop-
erty, a remedy that the California Supreme Court seemingly had read
out of the Constitution in Agins v. City of Tiburon.' Justice Brennan
realized that without the threat of monetary damages, communities
could win the land use war without ever winning a legal battle. The
developer's banker would eventually grow impatient with the delays,
and the developer would have to accede to unreasonable and unconsti-
tutional restrictions for lack of a monetary remedy for the delay.
Justice Brennan's dissent became, in effect, the law of the land in
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los
3. Do Growth Controls Matter?, supra note 2, at 35-40.
4. See Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86
YALE L.J 385 (1977).
5. See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 656 n.22
(1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
6. Id.
7. 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 373 (1979).
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Angeles.8 Given that the APA brief is directed towards the New
Hampshire Supreme Court, it is interesting to note that New Hamp-
shire did not wait for the United States Supreme Court to rule as to
what many saw as an obvious implication of the just compensation
clause. The New Hampshire court held in Burrows v. City of Keene9
that damages are an appropriate remedy for an unfair downzoning.
The reader willing to grant the foregoing might still ask, why not
pursue both goals? Let the open suburbs advocates pursue construc-
tion of low-income housing via the Mount Laurel approach, and let the
supply-side advocates pursue overall construction by the landowner-
damages approach. The problem with this live-and-let-litigate ap-
proach is that both remedies cannot usually be pursued at the same
time.'o The Mount Laurel remedy depends upon land-
owner/developers not having any general right to develop normal,
market-rate housing. In the following discussion of this proposition, I
assume for the sake of argument that the Mount Laurel remedy actu-
ally works as it is supposed to. There is little evidence that it does.'1
Indeed, the New Jersey Supreme Court's opinion in Mount Laurel
11112 which upheld the legislative response that actually subverts much
of Mount Laurel I and II, seems to have taken its cue from the late
Senator George Aiken of Vermont, who proposed that the solution to
the quagmire of the Vietnam War was to declare we'd won and get out.
The linchpin of the Mount Laurel approach is to require that local
governments impose a special charge on developers of normal, market-
rate housing. The charge's revenues are earmarked for low-income
housing.' 3 In order to be able to collect the charge, however, it is nec-
essary that the developer not be able to develop as much market rate
housing as he would like.
If a developer could go into Princeton Township and build more
houses just like those already there, then he would have no reason to
8. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
9. 121 N.H. 590, 432 A.2d 15 (1981).
10. The economic analysis of inclusionary zoning is based on W. FiSCHEL, supra
note 1, at 316-38; Clapp, The Impact of Inclusionary Zoning on the Location and Type
of Construction Activity, 9 AM. REAL. EsT. & URB. ECON. A. J. 436 (1981); and Ellick-
son, The Irony of Inclusionary Zoning, 54 S.C.L. REv. 1167 (1981).
11. See Briffault, Our Localism: Part I - The Structure of Local Government Law, 90
COLUM. L. REv. 1, 35-58 (1990) (examining the Mount Laurel doctrine).
12. Hills Dev. Co. v. Township of Bernards, 103 N.J. 1, 510 A.2d 621 (1986).
13. The charge is a tax in all but name, but the name is avoided by the courts, for
only the legislature can enact a tax.
1991]
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subsidize low-income housing. He would tell the township that if it
had to comply with the court's order, it should raise its property taxes
and pay someone to build the necessary low-income units. Because the
court apparently thought it could not require suburban governments to
tax themselves to do something they did not want to do, it found a tax
base - restrictive zoning already in place - that would be more ac-
ceptable. In effect, the court required local governments to sell rezon-
ings, with the proceeds going exclusively to low-income housing.14
Thus the remedy of inclusionary zoning, which the APA brief em-
braces with only trivial qualifications, requires that suburban zoning
laws must be excessively restrictive, compared to Ellickson's proposed
restrictions that would meet the harm-prevention test.15 Suburbs can-
not sell exceptions unless they have binding restrictions. Indeed, it
may be necessary for local governments to become more restrictive
over time. If a developer anticipated that next year the community
would play (or be required to play) the same inclusionary zoning game
with another developer, thus adding to local housing supply and lower-
ing its price, he might decline to participate on the grounds that the
profitability of his present plans would not be great enough to provide
the required subsidy. Fortunately for the would-be monopolist, the
New Jersey court and the APA brief assure him that once a predeter-
mined fair-share goal is met, the community can be as exclusionary as
it likes, as long as it democratically excludes people of all income
classes and is careful to rationalize it in acceptable subterfuges like
farmland preservation and environmental protection.16
The only question is whether the community will actually want to
become exclusive after satisfying its fair-share housing obligation.
Given the fiscal concerns and the anxiety about undesirables that moti-
vate suburban zoning, a community that has met its Mount Laurel
goals will most probably want to adopt an anti-growth policy. If it
tried to grow by permitting only market-rate housing, it would then be
subject to more fair-share low-income housing requirements, as they
are invariably calculated as a percentage of current population.
14. See W. FIscHEL, supra note 1, at 328; Rubin, Seneca & Stotsky, Affordable
Housing and Municipal Choice, 66 LAND ECON. 325 (1990).
15. See Ellickson, supra note 4.
16. See Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 92
N.J. 158, 219-20, 456 A.2d 390, 421 (1983) (Mount Laurel I) ("Once a community has
satisfied its fair-share obligation, the Mount Laurel doctrine will not restrict other meas-
ures, including large-lot and open area zoning, that would maintain its beauty and com-
munal character.").
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An example of what this leads to is described in an article by Bob
Narus."7 The town of Lincoln, Massachusetts, one of the richest and
most exclusively zoned in the state, is also one of the few to have met
the state's affordable housing goal, which is expressed as a percentage
of a community's current population. I learned from the town clerk
that its population is now about 5000, down from about 7000 in 1980,
apparently because of smaller households.
To meet the state's affordable housing goal, Lincoln made a devel-
oper pay for subsidized housing as a condition for building a commer-
cial structure. (Many of the pleasant-looking townhouses had late-
model cars in front of them when I visited, causing me to wonder
whether the town had invented inclusionary auto sales). Lincoln meets
the usual fair-share formula and need not grow at all, and its zoning
laws indicate that it plans not to grow. The supply effect is not trivial.
The town borders Route 128, the circumferential highway that is the
locus of suburban jobs in the Boston area. If Lincoln were developed
at the densities of nearby Wellesley, which is not regarded as over-
crowded, it would have about 35,000 people.
Given that an anti-growth policy is necessary to make the Mount
Laurel inclusionary remedy work and that most suburbs will eagerly
embrace anti-growth policies once they meet their fair-share quota, I
submit that a legal remedy that entitles landowners to construct nor-
mal, market-rate housing cannot coexist with the Mount Laurel rem-
edy. One exception to the foregoing conclusion might be to permit
only landowner/developers who proposed to build low-income housing
to collect a damages remedy for a regulatory taking. Aside from rais-
ing a constitutional doctrine that seemingly does not discriminate by
income class (imagine the highway department compensating only low-
income owners), the difficulty is that inverse condemnation can com-
pensate only for the value of what the landowner lost. Because most
landowners lose little by being prevented from doing what is not usu-
ally profitable for them to do, the amount of the damages would be
small, and the motivation for landowners to pursue their remedy is
slight. Such a claim should not be disallowed, of course; I only argue
that it would not help much.
Because the supply-side policy of landowner rights is incompatible
with Mount Laurel's inclusionary zoning policy, one must choose be-
tween opening the suburbs to the poor and increasing supply of hous-
17. Narus, Evolution of Growth Management in Lincoln, Massachusetts, 49 URB.
LAND. 16 (1990).
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ing generally. I previously have argued that many of the supposed
benefits of opening up the suburbs are overstated. 8 Furthermore, I
have found that restrictions on aggregate supply of housing from
growth controls hurt the poor by staunching the flow of used housing
normally made available by new construction.19 Because much of the
nation's housing stock is already in the suburbs, the much maligned
filtering process offers the best hope of enabling significant numbers of
the poor to move to the suburbs. Thus, even if one is concerned only
about the welfare of the poor, it is not obvious that one would want to
pursue the Mount Laurel policy.
But suppose the reader would opt for the open-suburbs policy for
other reasons and accept the growth limitations that accompany the
Mount Laurel remedy. One might argue that developers shut out of
the suburbs by growth controls just go to other jurisdictions. Not all
places have growth controls, after all. Maybe, in fact, the developers
will head back to the central cities and revitalize those places. Subur-
ban exclusion might be just the thing to help them out.
This issue is on the frontiers of research on land use controls. We do
not have much evidence about where development that is foreclosed in
the suburbs actually ends up. I have argued that it most probably
forces development into rural communities just beyond the exclusion-
ary suburbs. This happens until they, too, become exclusionary in out-
look, and the process proceeds all over again.20 This leads to excessive
decentralization of urban areas and its attendant social and economic
costs.
If I am right about this, there is a special irony in the case that occa-
sioned the APA brief. Land use controls by towns more convenient to
urban and transportation centers in southern New Hampshire and
eastern Massachusetts may have led to growth pressures in Chester,
the town accused of exclusionary zoning. The town is, I suspect, under
development pressure largely because the more conveniently located
towns in southern New Hampshire and eastern Massachusetts such as
Lincoln, Massachusetts, decided that they wanted to retain their
18. See W. FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 316-38.
19. See Weicher & Thibodeau, Filtering and Housing Markets: An Empirical Anal-
ysis, 23 J. URB. EcON. 21 (1988) (evidence that a high aggregate construction rate low-
ers the price of all housing and improves the quality of low-income units).
20. See W. FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 252-68; Fischel, Growth Management: Goodfor the Town, Bad for the Nation? A Comment (1990) (available at Dartmouth College
Economics Department).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol40/iss1/5
1991] EXCLUSIONARY ZONING AND GROWTH CONTROLS 73
"small town character" while at the same time enjoying the economic
benefits of location in the greater Boston metropolitan area. For those
who want real small town ambiance, I can recommend scores of lovely
towns in northern and western New England. You just have to learn
to live on rural incomes.
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